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Abstract
The subject of this article is the assessment of the effectiveness of medical procedures or interventions. In its first part I compare the different mean-
ings that the term effectiveness assumes in the context of assessing medical interventions, including the definition of the concept of consequential 
effectiveness, i.e. efficiency in achieving a certain objective of recognized value, distinguishing it from purely instrumental efficiency, i.e. effective-
ness in achieving any goal, and from ‘cost-effectiveness’ or economic efficiency. Next, I discuss various directions of relativization that allow for, 
and largely assume, assessments of the effectiveness of medical interventions, primarily considering the purpose, which serves as their point of 
reference. In the third part, I emphasize the different character of assessments of the effectiveness of medical procedures depending on whether they 
relate to the final or only to the indirect purpose of a given procedure. Finally, I consider the validity of the popular opposition of effectiveness and 
efficiency, and egalitarian fairness or justice (equity) in relation to health care procedures.
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1
The decision about the allocation of health resources 
is based on different types of assessments of medical pro-
cedures.2 Undoubtedly, one type of assessments of medi-
cal procedures or technologies that is significant – or 
indeed crucial – for the resource allocation is the assess-
ment of effectiveness. However, the meaning which is at-
tributed in this context to effective medical interventions 
is less obvious: are they to be understood as activities that 
serve the accomplishment of a certain goal, whose value 
does not have to be assumed by the evaluating entity, or 
as procedures that are effective in the implementation of 
certain goods appreciated and valued by the entity, and if 
so, which ones.
Medical procedures or healthcare services can be as-
sessed from several different viewpoints. First of all, they 
can be evaluated taking into account the suitability and 
the rank of their purpose, i.e. because of their own suit-
ability and teleological validity. For example, a low or 
even negative assessment of cosmetic surgery as one of 
the technically feasible healthcare services is often due 
to the belief that enhancing the appearance is not a legiti-
mate purpose of medicine, and even if it falls within its 
scope, it takes a subordinate position.3 
Having established the internal purpose of a given 
kind of medical procedure, as well as its suitability and 
rank, one can evaluate the procedure taking into ac-
count three other features, each of which is sometimes 
ambiguously referred to as effectiveness. Firstly, medi-
cal procedures – just like any other intentional actions 
– can be evaluated taking into account the effectiveness 
with which they fulfil their goal, i.e. the aspect of their 
instrumental efficiency. Secondly, they are evaluated in 
terms of their consequential effectiveness, in particular 
the utilitarian aspect, i.e. looking at the value of their 
desired result (especially the benefit that results from 
them). Thirdly, medical procedures may also be subjected 
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to (simple or comparative) assessments due to their eco-
nomic (or ‘cost’) effectiveness, i.e. the ratio of the value 
of their results to the amount of their costs. Let us take 
a closer look at these three concepts.
The assessment of instrumental efficiency, i.e. the ef-
fectiveness of an action, takes into account whether and 
to what extent the assessed activity achieves its purpose, 
and so realizes the intended effect. The subject of this 
type of assessment may be both individual activities and 
entire types or categories of activities having a specific 
goal or set of objectives. When assessing the effective-
ness of a certain type of activity, the average effective-
ness of individual activities belonging to this type is 
taken into account.
An important feature of assessments determining the 
instrumental efficiency of certain medical procedures – if 
it is understood only as such, i.e. captured in its pure form 
– is their ethical neutrality. Therefore, the assessment of 
the purely instrumental efficiency of a procedure affirms 
only whether and to what extent the assessed form of ac-
tion is effective in achieving a possible or actual goal, 
without prejudging whether this possible or actual goal is 
also desirable or worth pursuing. Such ethically neutral 
understanding of effectiveness is also possible in relation 
to medical activities. For example, the effectiveness of 
different sterilization methods for men can be evaluated 
also by someone who does not think that men should be 
sterilized. Similarly – although it may not be necessar-
ily worthwhile – the effectiveness of different types of 
screening for Down’s syndrome may be compared, tak-
ing into account their effectiveness in achieving the pos-
sible goal of reducing the number of children born with 
the syndrome, without prejudging whether the number of 
children born with the syndrome should be reduced, and 
whether it should be done via abortion, which sometimes, 
though not always, is a result of a positive result of spe-
cially adapted prenatal tests.4
The ethical neutrality that is part of the purely instru-
mental effectiveness of medical procedures cannot – by 
its very nature – be maintained in those assessments 
that determine their consequential or economic effec-
tiveness. What these two types of assessments have in 
common is that they incorporate the concept of benefit 
(already imbued with positive meaning): the former is to 
determine the overall benefit – or the total value of partial 
benefits – that can be obtained through a given proce-
dure; the latter is to determine the connection between 
the benefits obtained through a given procedure (or addi-
tional benefits) and related costs (or additional costs). In 
both cases, however, the amount (value) of benefits that 
certain procedures generate depends also on the value of 
their objective, and not only on the extent or degree in 
which they implement it.
Assessment of an action’s instrumental effectiveness 
is an assessment of its effectiveness in achieving a certain 
goal, whose value, significance or weight is not assumed 
in the assessment itself. If the goal we evaluate a given 
activity for is considered valuable or important, then the 
subject of our assessment is also the consequential ef-
fectiveness of this activity. The consequential effective-
ness of an action depends on how important the objec-
tive is and how efficiently or to what extent this goal is 
achieved through this action. Therefore, the assessment 
of consequential effectiveness of an action is – in essence 
– a complex evaluation, assuming or containing the two 
forms of simpler assessments indicated above.
If the assessment of consequential effectiveness of 
medical procedures includes mainly or exclusively their 
health benefits, the established effectiveness is also called 
clinical effectiveness. Understood in this way, clinical ef-
fectiveness is further divided into effectiveness that some 
intervention shows under ideal conditions of clinical tri-
als, i.e. experimental effectiveness (or efficacy), and the 
effectiveness – often diverging from efficacy – which 
this same intervention (generically) has in real medical 
practice, i.e. practical effectiveness (or simply effective-
ness).5 The clinical effectiveness of medical interventions 
–both in its practical and experimental aspects – is some-
times understood in a slightly narrower sense, where it 
is contrasted with safety or harmlessness. For example, 
the therapeutic value of a medicine depends both on the 
probability with which it allows to achieve desired effects 
and on whether it is associated with an excessive risk of 
negative consequences or ‘side effects’. However, it can 
be assumed that an effective medical intervention should 
fulfil both the positive aim (to bring improvement) and 
the negative aim (not to cause harm). Understood in this 
way, the effectiveness of the medical procedure is implic-
itly safe, harmless and unburdensome.
Having established – on the one hand – the value 
of the result and, on the other, the cost of the medical 
procedure, its profitability or economic efficiency, also 
called cost-effectiveness, can be assessed. The principle 
of economic efficiency is that we should proceed in such 
a way as to achieve the best result at the lowest pos-
sible cost. Therefore, having at your disposal a certain 
resource, you should use it to achieve the best result; and 
having to achieve a certain result, you should accomplish 
it with the least possible amount of funds. In the case of 
a procedure stretched over time, its costs can include not 
only the funds launched for its implementation (e.g. re-
sources needed to carry out an operation), but also those 
used during its implementation, and sometimes even after 
its completion (e.g. costs of treating the adverse conse-
quences of the procedure). 
Let me complement these initial remarks on the vari-
ous ways of understanding the concept of effectiveness 
with a comment: all the meanings of the term contain 
a harmless, but sometimes deceptive, ambiguity, which is 
also characteristic of many other elements of the vast cat-
egory of abstract nouns derived from adjectives to which 
it belongs. Another example of a similarly ‘indetermi-
nate’ concept may be that of lightness, including when it 
is used to describe the colours. In one sense, the lightness 
of colours means a certain aspect or ‘dimension’ availa-
ble to all colours. All colours can be described in terms of 
lightness, distinguishing among them more or less light, 
as well as light and dark. Even the dark colours, however, 
have a certain lightness in this wider sense, in that they 
are somehow defined in terms of lightness, whereas the 
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lightness of colours in a narrower sense means a feature 
that distinguishes the light colours from dark ones, and 
is therefore only attributed to the colours perceived as 
sufficiently light. The same applies to effectiveness. In 
a broader sense, the effectiveness of an action is a feature 
that is attributable to all activities with a specific purpose, 
performed in a better or worse fashion, more effectively 
or less so. In a narrower sense, however, the effectiveness 
of an action is a trait that serves to distinguish between 
effective and ineffective actions, i.e. it is attributed only 
to the actions evaluated as effective or effective enough. 
Apart from the effectiveness of medical interventions in 
the sense of the most general feature or ‘aspect’, which 
we have in mind when distinguishing effective and in-
effective interventions, or effectiveness in the sense of 
a feature that serves to distinguish those interventions 
that are effective to a sufficient degree (or to a degree 
higher than the average), there is a third, somewhat in-
direct, meaning of effectiveness. In its consequential 
understanding, this effectiveness is also referred to as ap-
propriateness, and is typical of medical interventions that 
are minimally effective, in that they bring at least slightly 
more benefit than damage. According to the definition 
provided by Park et al. [4], when describing a medical 
procedure as appropriate, we state that “the expected 
health benefit (i.e. increased life expectancy, relief of 
pain, reduction in anxiety, improved functional capacity) 
exceeded the expected negative consequences (i.e. mor-
tality, morbidity, anxiety of anticipating the procedure, 
pain produced by the procedure, time lost from work) by 
a sufficiently wide margin that the procedure was worth 
doing.”6
2
Both instrumental and consequential effectiveness of 
certain medical interventions consist in their effective-
ness in the implementation of an indicated or assumed 
goal. On some occasions, this particular goal that we 
evaluate a given intervention for, is already ‘inscribed’ 
into the concept itself, so that it does not have to be given 
separately; for example, it is not necessary to state what 
purpose effective analgesia or effective life-saving sur-
gery have, because we know that the goal of the latter 
is to save lives, while the former serves to prevent pain. 
Often, however, medical intervention can realize – or has 
to simultaneously pursue – several different goals, but its 
effectiveness in their implementation can be diversified; 
for example, acupuncture may be effective – to some 
extent – as a method of relieving pain or nausea, but inef-
fective as an alleged (and publicised) way of “strengthen-
ing the body”.
Even after defining the objective, in view of which 
the given action is assessed as instrumentally or conse-
quentially effective, this assessment requires even more 
(and manifold) relativization. The very same (abstractly 
speaking) action or procedure can achieve its goal effec-
tively or ineffectively, or more or less effectively depend-
ing on who performs it, on whom it is performed, as well 
as the manner or circumstances in which it is performed. 
This manifold relativization – whether clearly formulated 
or only implicitly understood – is also needed in the case 
of an assessment of the effectiveness of medical interven-
tions. 
Firstly, therefore, the effectiveness of a medical pro-
cedure will often and to a large extent depend on who 
the operation is performed by. The widely understood 
medical interventions may be performed by healthcare 
workers – a doctor, a nurse or a paramedic – but also the 
patients themselves. The physician performing the op-
eration or interpreting the results of diagnostic tests may 
be better or worse educated and qualified, experienced 
to varying degrees, and more or less efficient at a given 
moment. Also the patient who is to regularly take the pre-
scribed medicine or perform the recommended exercises 
will be more or less patient, determined and disciplined 
(usually less rather than more). Most medical interven-
tions, however, require a patient’s cooperation, not just 
their consent to the procedure. If the patient does not per-
form his / her part of the ‘job’, the part performed by the 
medical staff may in the end go to waste; for example, the 
screening tests for Alzheimer’s disease make little sense 
if the patients who have worrying symptoms generally do 
not report for further tests.
Secondly, the effectiveness of a medical intervention 
depends on whom, or what patient or group of patients, it 
is performed. The same intervention, which in a broader 
category of people (e.g. suffering from cancer of an or-
gan) is statistically ineffective, can be much more effec-
tive when it is more precisely ‘targeted’, i.e. applied to 
patients belonging to a narrower category (e.g. cancer 
with a specific genetic basis). What is true of the effec-
tiveness of medical interventions is of course true of their 
safety or harmlessness: the same therapy, which for most 
patients is statistically rather safe, may be very harmful 
for a certain group of people.
Thirdly, the effectiveness of a given medical proce-
dure is always – and to some extent – dependent on how 
this procedure is performed. The degree of this depend-
ence may be higher or lower. If it is high enough – as 
when a procedure can be performed not only in a more 
or less efficient way, but also correctly or incorrectly – it 
could even be the reason for distinguishing between the 
abstract scheme of a given procedure (which we could 
then call ‘medical technology’) and more specific ‘medi-
cal interventions’ where this technology is used.
All the directions of relativization presented above, 
which must complement the assessment of the effective-
ness of medical interventions, also provide the basis for 
distinguishing two main variants of this type of effective-
ness which in English is often communicated through 
separate terms. Taking into account the dependence of 
the effectiveness of an action on the efficiency of the 
person who performs it, the properties of the person it 
concerns, and the way it is performed, efficacy and effec-
tiveness are juxtaposed in relation to medical procedures 
or technologies.7 The experimental effectiveness – effi-
cacy – of a tested medicine means its capacity to induce 
the intended effects under ideal conditions which are en-
sured in clinical trials, while its (practical) effectiveness 
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is understood as the capability to cause these effects in 
medical practice. For example, the same drugs that are 
highly effective when applied at appropriate doses and 
at appropriate intervals by specialists during clinical tri-
als may be much less effective when administered by the 
patients themselves8.
3
When assessing the effectiveness of a medical in-
tervention, its goal must always be considered, yet it is 
not always quite clear what it is. Medical interventions 
have different goals, closer and further. For example, 
the closest goal of prophylactic statin use is to lower the 
blood cholesterol, a slightly further goal is to prevent 
atherosclerosis, and even further still is to reduce the 
risk of heart attack or stroke, for example, but this aim of 
a long-term prophylactic intervention is still only an in-
direct goal. Indirect goals of medical interventions form 
a sequence that leads to some final goal. The final or ulti-
mate goal is always a certain aspect of health, good life or 
well-being, either a rather specific aspect (e.g. avoiding 
premature death due to heart disease), or quite general 
(how to protect yourself from premature death caused by 
any reason). When examining the comparative effective-
ness of various alternative medical interventions, it is 
clearly easier to compare their effectiveness in achiev-
ing a close, immediate objective (e.g. by checking how 
effectively different types of statins lower cholesterol). 
However, as has been repeatedly stated, these indirect 
goals included in the assessments of the effectiveness 
of medical interventions, can only function as surro-
gate endpoints9. The assessment of the effectiveness of 
medical interventions in the implementation of a certain 
surrogate end-point is unreliable, and, in fact, not very 
interesting until we establish a close correlation between 
this surrogate end-point and some specific aspect of the 
final goal (true end-point). The closeness of this correla-
tion, and sometimes even its very existence, is sometimes 
questioned or ‘contested’. For example, in the case of the 
‘cholesterol dispute’ that has been going on for years, 
some people have said that even if statins lead to a re-
duction in blood lipids, it remains unknown whether it 
prevents atherosclerosis, and even if it does prevent ath-
erosclerosis, it remains unknown whether it reduces the 
risk of death due to heart disease, and even if it reduces 
the risk of death from heart disease, it remains unknown 
whether it reduces the risk of death occurring due to any 
other reason [12]. In this situation, when assessing the 
effectiveness of medical interventions, it would be safest 
to take into account their final goals. Unfortunately, these 
principled assessments of medical procedures are often 
difficult, for several reasons [13]. Firstly, even if we have 
serious reasons to believe that realizing the indirect goal 
of medical intervention is – to some extent – conducive 
to achieving its ultimate goal, it is often difficult to deter-
mine the exact extent; meanwhile, without this quantita-
tive evaluation it is impossible to establish a comparative 
effectiveness of medical interventions that serve various 
closer or indirect objectives. Secondly, in order to assess 
the effectiveness of medical interventions in relation to 
their ultimate or final goals, we often have doubts as 
to which of the possible goals of a given intervention 
should be considered ultimate or final; for example, we 
may hesitate whether the ultimate goal of prenatal testing 
towards Down’s syndrome can also be the mere aware-
ness of a woman that her child will be burdened with 
this disadvantage, regardless of whether this awareness 
is necessary for her or whether it will affect her practi-
cal decisions. Thirdly, there are various aspects of health, 
good life or well-being that are suitable final goals of 
medical interventions, so that even if we determine that 
the assessed intervention has a positive effect on one of 
these aspects (e.g. freedom from pain), we do not often 
have the certainty that it does not cause a negative effect 
on another (e.g. level of consciousness).
The scope of the final goals of medicine or health 
care can be delimited more extensively or less so. In its 
narrowest form, it covers everything which contributes to 
human health or a healthy life (and only that): well-being, 
efficient functioning or living to an age when death is 
not said to have come too early. In a somewhat broader 
sense, the scope of the ultimate goals of medicine – the 
final goals of human endeavours that can be implemented 
to some extent with the help of skills, means and medi-
cal actions – also includes elements of human well-being 
or happiness, which are generally considered different 
and relatively independent of health. This ‘extra’, health-
unrelated element of well-being, can be even satisfaction 
with one’s appearance, regarded as the legitimate aim 
of aesthetic surgery, or acceptance of one’s sexual con-
stitution, which at times can only be achieved by a sex 
reassignment surgery. Even more broadly, the sphere of 
actual and ultimate goals of medicine is defined when 
it includes such goods as autonomy, freedom or knowl-
edge – goods that are generally not considered to be ele-
ments of happiness or well-being, but as ‘non-welfare’ 
values. However, way beyond the limits of medical 
utilitarianism or welfarism goes the concept including 
not only the goods of the person – related to health, or 
not – but also some interpersonal or situational goods,10 
such as a fair or even distribution of certain goods that 
are retained or recovered through medical care.
The distinction between indirect and final objectives 
of medical interventions is particularly important when 
opposing complex and simple interventions. Some medi-
cal or health-related interventions are limited to one rela-
tively simple operation, such as when someone is taking 
a pill to relieve a headache. Most medical interventions, 
however, are complex interventions that include many 
consecutive (and sometimes co-occurring) component 
activities, either homogeneous or heterogeneous. Vari-
ous activities that are part of a complex intervention 
are usually used to accomplish a certain subordinate 
or indirect goal, which, however, makes sense only as 
long as it is a means to implement the overriding objec-
tive of the whole procedure. For example, screening for 
Alzheimer’s disease, or non-invasive (and therefore in-
conclusive) prenatal testing for Down’s syndrome is in 
itself the only non-independent stage of a more extensive 
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diagnostic process; they can, therefore, be truly effective 
only if their possible positive results are confirmed or re-
futed by a definitive or proper diagnosis (e.g. chorionic 
villus sampling and amniocentesis with suspected Down 
syndrome or by complex neurological examinations for 
symptoms indicative of Alzheimer’s disease). However, 
the non-independent element of a more comprehensive 
medical procedure is often its main or the most difficult 
stage, as it is with transplant surgery, which in itself could 
be the most successful and yet ineffective (or even ‘coun-
ter-effective’) in achieving its final goal if the transplant 
recipient does not receive appropriate immunosuppres-
sive medicine.
An example of an intervention consisting of many 
homogeneous parts could be a series of injections, any 
longer pharmacological treatment, or a series of meet-
ings with a psychotherapist. The final purpose of such 
intervention can be implemented either gradually by 
individual actions (such as successive injections), or 
achieved only after the appropriate number of them 
has been performed. Also an indirect situation is possi-
ble, when individual elements or subsets of elements of 
a complex medical procedure accomplish successively 
its various partial goals (as in the case of psychotherapy, 
whose subsequent, deeper goals are to be implemented 
by appropriate ‘doses’ of meetings with the therapist).11
4
The effectiveness of medical interventions is often 
mentioned as one of its two principal qualities, some-
times co-occurring, but often colliding with the no-less-
fundamental quality of egalitarian justice. This opposi-
tion – in English captured by the terms effectiveness (or 
efficiency) and equity [16] – is undoubtedly justified if it 
refers to utilitarian effectiveness, or to effectiveness in 
implementing the welfarist good. The utilitarian principle 
of maximizing the sum of individual benefits achieved in 
the dimension of well-being or good life must indeed col-
lide with the idea of their most equal distribution between 
different individuals or groups of people. However, as 
already pointed out, utilitarian effectiveness, and in par-
ticular the effectiveness in realizing individual health 
benefits, is only one of the varieties of the broadly under-
stood consequential effectiveness. 
Suppose we are to divide a limited number of medical 
resources between two groups of people – for example, 
residents of two different regions – whose populations are 
more or less equal, but which differ in their health condi-
tion and the resulting life expectancy: in the first group 
it amounting to the average 70 years of age, while in the 
second – only 65. And suppose we have to choose and 
start the implementation of one of two promising health 
programs. Program A will be intended for the members 
of the first, ‘better-performing’ group, and according to 
rational estimates (as it can be unrealistically assumed), 
it will increase their average life expectancy by 5 years, 
raising it to 75. Program B will be intended for members 
of the second, worse-performing group and, according to 
equally valid calculations, will also increase their average 
life expectancy by 5 years, raising it to 70. If the second 
program, intuitively fairer, does not outweigh the first un-
der any medically significant aspect – for example, guar-
anteeing a greater improvement of the quality of life to its 
potential beneficiaries – then, on the basis of utilitarian-
ism, we have no reason to grant it superiority. The first 
program would not give way to the second in terms of 
consequential effectiveness, measured according to utili-
tarian rules. And if we were to assume that – as a result 
of its implementation – the average life expectancy in 
the better-performing group would increase even slightly 
more, e.g. by 5.5 years, then it would also have an ethical 
advantage over the other. Can these rather disconcerting 
conclusions be avoided in some way, without going be-
yond the limits of consequentialism, in its broader sense?
Well, it can be shown that there is a way, and – for-
mally speaking – it is twofold. The outlined problem con-
cerns the assessment of medical interventions in terms of 
their effectiveness, which I propose to be defined as con-
sequential. This terminological suggestion seems justi-
fied also due to the fact that the task of these assessments 
is precisely to say to what extent the considered interven-
tion satisfies the normative theory of consequentialism. 
The central thesis of this theory is the norm also referred 
to as the principle of maximizing good. It tells us that in 
every situation we should act in a way that (at least ac-
cording to rational prognoses) leads to the best result, or 
to put it more clearly: to the result of the highest ethical 
value. The result of the action, on which consequential-
ists focus their attention, is usually associated with the 
total sum of consequences (hence the name), although 
sometimes it is also extended to the action itself (its in-
ternal value may be an important component of the total 
value of the complete result). When assessing the result 
of an action, we can limit ourselves to its consequences, 
which have a certain internal value, and therefore only 
take into account the consequences that are good or bad 
in themselves (as all remaining consequences will be 
counted anyway, since they contribute to this internal 
value).
The principle of consequentialism requires us to pro-
ceed in every situation in a way that will (probably) result 
in consequences of the highest total internal value. The 
command as such – the obligation to maximize the good 
– is, however, of a very general and rather formal nature. 
It does not determine what can be attributed an intrinsic 
value or what it is based on. In other words, it specifies 
neither the carriers of internal value nor its criteria. Utili-
tarianism attempts to fill both gaps by introducing two 
further principles. First of all, it assumes that the carrier 
of a positive internal value can only be a good belonging 
to the person or person’s life – something whose posses-
sion or experiencing makes the person’s life better than 
it would be without having or experiencing it. Since in 
English the good life of a person is also often referred 
to as welfare, or well-being, this first peculiar thesis, 
which distinguishes utilitarianism from other varieties 
of consequentialism, can be called the principle of wel-
farist goods. Secondly, utilitarians assume that the inner 
value of the good of the person can only depend or be 
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based on something that – through being owned or expe-
rienced – makes the person’s life somewhat better (more 
satisfactory, happy, successful) than it would be other-
wise. And so, if something that gives value to something 
else is regarded as the criterion of this value, this second 
thesis of utilitarianism can be defined as the principle of 
welfarist criteria. According to the principle of welfarist 
goods, the only final benefit that can result from a certain 
medical intervention is the improvement of the value of 
a person’s life, either by increasing its welfaristic quality 
or by increasing its length (assuming that its welfaristic 
quality is not too low, and so that it would be worth ex-
tending). According to the principle of welfarist criteria, 
the value of the benefit that a person derives from a cer-
tain medical intervention does not depend on anything 
other than the greatness of this benefit – the greater, the 
more the intervention improves the welfarist quality of 
life of the person or increases its length. Assuming, then, 
that the value of a certain life benefit does not depend on 
anything other than its greatness (in the given sense), the 
principle of welfaristic criteria recognizes, among other 
things, that it is not dependent on who benefits from it 
or when they benefit from it, or any other circumstance 
that is not related to the greatness of the benefit itself. In 
other words, the principle of welfarist criteria – despite 
its clearly non-utilitarian implications – yields a particu-
lar demand for equality: as it imposes that equal weight 
be granted (and, as a result, equal value) to equally great 
life benefits experienced by different people (or the same 
person at various stages of their life).
As it is not difficult to notice, it is this pair of utilitari-
an premises, concretizing the consequentialist principle of 
maximizing good, which leads to intuitively unacceptable 
conclusions drawn from the example of the two programs 
presented above. Since the only or decisive reason for 
favouring one health program over another is the greater 
sum of benefits that the first provides, and since the ben-
efit derived from the program by the inhabitants of the 
region with a longer life expectancy is (at least) equal to 
that which is drawn by the residents who live shorter, we 
have no reason not to assign it – or actually we do have 
a reason to assign it – on preferential terms to help the 
first group. At the same time, however, the same simple 
example allows us to realize how one can waive this con-
clusion, difficult to accept due to its incompatibility with 
even the most basic egalitarianism. One of the strategies 
that comes to mind here is, of course, the question of chal-
lenging the exclusive validity or even supreme role of the 
principle of maximizing good, and therefore recognizing 
that this consequentialist rule is only one of the equivalent 
principles defining our duties, which are supplemented – 
and often contested – by other leading norms, such as the 
principle of respect for autonomy, or – importantly for the 
example we are discussing – the principle of egalitarian 
justice. This deontological pluralism, or at least duality, 
is assumed when consequential or economic efficiency 
(effectiveness or efficiency) is contrasted with egalitarian 
justice (equity). In addition to this solution, which entails 
a complete break with consequentialism, two somewhat 
more conciliatory solutions can be proposed. In the ex-
ample presented, one of them is based on the assumption 
that the individual health benefits received by the ben-
eficiaries of the aid program for residents with a shorter 
life expectancy – i.e. the additional years of life they ob-
tain – do not constitute all the benefits of the program. 
To these individual or personal benefits one must add an 
interpersonal benefit, which is the removal of inequalities 
that existed so far between the two groups of residents: 
if before receiving additional medical help, the inhabit-
ants of the second region lived on average 5 years shorter 
than the inhabitants of the first region, after receiving 
the aid program the average life expectancy will be the 
same. The second consensual solution, allowing its sup-
porters to remain within the theory of consequentialism, 
but avoiding the utilitarian paradoxes, is based on the 
assumption that even if the benefits of alternative health 
programs boil down to additional years of life obtained 
by their beneficiaries, these life benefits for the region’s 
inhabitants with the smaller life expectancy in the final 
and complete assessment have a greater value than the 
benefits of residents who live longer; even though the 
benefit of the inhabitants of the first region has the same 
statistical value as the advantage enjoyed by the inhabit-
ants of the second region, the value of these benefits is not 
equal: 5 additional years of life for a person whose life 
would be shorter without obtaining aid, has more value 
than the same (speaking of its welfaristic quality) 5 years 
of life for a person who would live longer without aid.
Observations arising from the given example can be 
generalized. The non-intuitive consequences to which 
standard utilitarianism leads in the ethics of distribution, 
and in particular the allocation of health resources, do 
not arise from the general principle of maximizing good, 
shared with other variants of widely understood conse-
quentialism, but result from a pair of its specifications: 
the principle of welfarist goods, defining the range of 
goods which are entitled to internal value, and the prin-
ciples of welfarist criteria, indicating the foundation of 
the value of these goods. Both of these principles can 
be rejected or modified, while adopting the perspective 
of some type of consequentialism, albeit not utilitarian, 
yet extended or supplemented. It’s one version will be 
the concept of additional goods, expanding the range of 
goods that require maximization with certain non-wel-
farist or even non-personal goods, such as the situational 
good of social equality in the distribution of benefits, 
without increasing (or reducing) the sum of these ben-
efits. It can also be said that by expanding the range of 
goods that should be included in the assessment of the 
benefits of a given medical intervention, this first concept 
also extends the very notion of benefits, as – in addition 
to individual health benefits – it recognizes the related, 
but not equivalent, social benefits, which – as in the ex-
ample of equalizing the average life expectancy in two 
population groups – also deserve to be called ‘health ben-
efits’ and require taking into account the effectiveness of 
medical interventions. The second version of the modi-
fied consequentialism, which in practice may lead to the 
same decisions as the first, but from a theoretical point of 
view occupies a separate position, is the concept of ad-
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ditional criteria. In contrast to the concept of additional 
goods, it does not extend the scope of benefits requiring 
to be taken into account in assessing the effectiveness of 
a procedure, but points to additional, non-welfaristic fac-
tors determining their value; for example, the value of 
an advantage that a person derives from a life-extending 
therapy may be dependent not only on the number of 
years he or she continues to live, but also on how long or 
short-lived they would be without this therapy. 
If we accept one of the presented versions of extend-
ed consequentialism – i.e. if we recognize either the ad-
ditional goods that may constitute the benefits of medical 
interventions, or additional criteria, co-determining the 
value of these benefits – then effectiveness in health care 
should not be contrasted with egalitarian justice since it 
is already contained in it.
Notes
1 The following article is related to my research project 
titled “Justice in healthcare”, financed by the National Science 
Centre as part of the Maestro 4 competition.
2 Medical procedures – the term included in the title of 
this article – is only a convenient mental shortcut, replacing 
the longer enumeration of medical procedures or medical tech-
nologies, or health programs, or strategies in health care etc. 
– all these forms of action can be evaluated in terms of their 
effectiveness.
3 See, for example [1]. Another example is the relatively 
low – third before last – position of infertility treatment in the 
ranking of health services containing 17 degrees of importance 
and developed in the second phase of the health system reform 
in the State of Oregon. This low position, of course, did not 
result from the assessment of the effectiveness of this category 
of services, which – depending on the technique used – can 
have extremely varied effectiveness, measured by the number 
of cases of successfully initiated and successfully finalized pre-
gnancies. Rather, it resulted from the low rank assigned to the 
purpose of these benefits, that is, the reproduction itself, becau-
se of the three criteria of importance adopted by the committee: 
value for basic health care, value for society and value for the 
individual in need of those benefits [2].
4 Gilbert et al. [3] compare different types of screening 
tests for Down’s syndrome, assessing their safety, efficiency 
and cost effectiveness. Efficiency is effectiveness in achieving 
the intended goal but it is not clear what is to be considered 
the exact goal of prenatal screening tests. The authors take 
into account the ‘social perspective’, according to which the 
goal would be to “maximize health gain for a given cost” – 
which probably should be understood as being able to achieve 
– through a given cost – the highest quality of life for women or 
parents, which would inevitably drop after having a child with 
Down’s syndrome – but they consider this concept problematic 
(p. 4). Themselves, they assume that when assessing the effec-
tiveness of the analyzed types of screening tests, their effective-
ness in achieving the goal of preventing the birth of a live child 
with Down’s syndrome should be taken into account. Based on 
empirical data, they conclude that the two most economical-
ly effective ways to achieve this goal are the measurement of 
nuchal translucency and the integrated test. In the case of the 
former, carried out in a certain female population, the cost of 
preventing the birth of one live child with Down’s syndrome 
was £22,000, while the cost of the latter amounted to £51,000.
5 See below, footnote 7.
6 At other times, however, appropriateness can be distin-
guished from effectiveness on a different basis. Mandelblatt et 
al. [5] write that while effectiveness means “the impact of an 
intervention of health in real practice settings”, appropriate-
ness “reflects a broader range of issues considered in deciding 
whether an intervention should or should not be done, including 
acceptability, feasibility, and cost-effectiveness”; p. 552.
7 According to Haynes [6–8], the terms efficacy and ef-
fectiveness – the names of two values to be determined in the 
assessment of medical interventions – were introduced by the 
British pioneering epidemiologist Archie Cochrane, who added 
to them a third value, called cost-effectiveness. In his conci-
se description, he reffered to the experimental effectiveness 
assessment as determining whether an intervention may work 
(“Can it work?”), i.e. bring more benefit than harm under ide-
al conditions, practical effectiveness assessment determining 
whether it works in practice (“Does it work in practice?”), 
and cost-effectiveness assessment answering the question of 
whether the benefits derived from this intervention are worth 
its cost (“Is it worth it?”).
8 For example, it has been pointed out that although neu-
roleptics for schizophrenic patients administered in the form of 
tablets may have the same clinical effectiveness as the same 
medicine administered in long-acting injections, which the pa-
tient receives during hospitalization, in practice are much less 
effective than the latter method, because some patients do not 
take them in the right doses or even shortly after discharge from 
the hospital, stop taking them entirely; Rynek Zdrowia, 19 li-
stopada 2015 r., Eksperci: leki w iniekcjach to mniejsze koszty 
leczenia schizofrenii; http://www.rynekzdrowia.pl/Uslugi-me-
dyczne/Eksperci-leki-w-iniekcje-to-mniejsze-kleszty-leczenia-
-schizofrenii,156900,8.html (accessed: 01.10.2017) [9]. 
9 See for example [10, 11].
10 Regarding situational goods [14].
11 See Howard et al. [15]. The authors distinguish three 
phases of psychotherapy – remoralization, remediation, reha-
bilitation – each of them defining a specific goal. In the first 
phase, it is the improvement of subjective well-being, in the 
second the alleviation of distressing symptoms, and only in the 
third more lasting improvement in life functioning.
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